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Abstract—Due to the broad range of applications of stochastic
multi-armed bandit model, understanding the effects of adver-
sarial attacks and designing bandit algorithms robust to attacks
are essential for the safe applications of this model. In this paper,
we introduce a new class of attack named action-manipulation
attack. In this attack, an adversary can change the action
signal selected by the user. We show that without knowledge
of mean rewards of arms, our proposed attack can manipulate
Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm, a widely used bandit
algorithm, into pulling a target arm very frequently by spending
only logarithmic cost. To defend against this class of attacks, we
introduce a novel algorithm that is robust to action-manipulation
attacks when an upper bound for the total attack cost is given.
We prove that our algorithm has a pseudo-regret upper bounded
by O(max{log T,A}), where T is the total number of rounds and
A is the upper bound of the total attack cost.
Index Terms—Stochastic bandits, action-manipulation attack,
UCB.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to develop trustworthy machine learning systems,
understanding adversarial attacks on learning systems and
correspondingly building robust defense mechanisms have
attracted significant recent research interests [2]–[9]. In this
paper, we focus on multiple armed bandits (MABs), a simple
but very powerful framework of online learning that makes de-
cisions over time under uncertainty. MABs problem is widely
investigated in machine learning and signal processing [10]–
[16] and has many applicants in a variety of scenarios such as
displaying advertisements [17], articles recommendation [18],
cognitive radios [19], [20] and search engines [21], to name a
few.
Of particular relevance to our work is a line of interesting
recent work on online reward-manipulation attacks on stochas-
tic MABs [22]–[25]. In the reward-manipulation attacks, there
is an adversary who can change the reward signal from the
environment, and hence the reward signal received by the
user is not the true reward signal from the environment. In
particular, [22] proposes an interesting attack strategy that
can force a user, who runs either -Greedy and or Upper
Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm, to select a target arm
while only spending effort that grows in logarithmic order.
[23] proposes an optimization based framework for offline
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reward-manipulation attacks. Furthermore, it studies a form
of online attack strategy that is effective in attacking any
bandit algorithm that has a regret scaling in logarithm order,
without knowing what particular algorithm the user is using.
[25] considers an attack model where an adversary attacks with
a certain probability at each round but its attack value can be
arbitrary and unbounded. The paper proposes algorithms that
are robust to these types of attacks. [24] considers how to
defend against reward-manipulation attacks, a complementary
problem to [22], [23]. In particular, [24] introduces a bandit
algorithm that is robust to reward-manipulation attacks under
certain attack cost, by using a multi-layer approach. [26]
introduces another model of adversary setting where each arm
is able to manipulate its own reward and seeks to maximize
its own expected number of pull count. Under this setting,
[26] analyzes the robustness of Thompson Sampling, UCB,
and -greedy with the adversary, and proves that all three
algorithms achieve a regret upper bound that increases over
rounds in a logarithmic order or increases with attack cost
in a linear order. This line of reward-manipulation attack has
also recently been investigated for contextual bandits in [27],
which develops an attack algorithm that can force the bandit
algorithm to pull a target arm for a target contextual vector by
slightly manipulating rewards in the data.
In this paper, we introduce a new class of attacks on MABs
named action-manipulation attack. In the action-manipulation
attack, an attacker, sitting between the environment and the
user, can change the action selected by the user to another ac-
tion. The user will then receive a reward from the environment
corresponding to the action chosen by the attacker. Compared
with the reward-manipulation attacks discussed above, the
action-manipulation attack is more difficult to carry out. In
particular, as the action-manipulation attack only changes
the action, it can impact but does not have direct control
of the reward signal, because the reward signal will be a
random variable drawn from a distribution depending on the
action chosen by the attacker. This is in contrast to reward-
manipulation attacks where an attacker has direct control and
can change the reward signal to any value.
In order to demonstrate the significant security threat of
action-manipulation attacks to stochastic bandits, we propose
an action-manipulation attack strategy against the widely used
UCB algorithm. The proposed attack strategy aims to force
the user to pull a target arm chosen by the attacker frequently.
We assume that the attacker does not know the true mean
reward of each arm. The assumption that the attacker does
not know the mean rewards of arms is necessary, as otherwise
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the attacker can perform the attack trivially. To see this, with
the knowledge of the mean rewards, the attacker knows which
arm has the worst mean reward and can perform the following
oracle attack: when the user pulls a non-target arm, the attacker
change the arm to the worst arm. This oracle attack makes all
non-target arms have expected rewards less than that of the
target arm, if the target arm selected by the attacker is not
the worst arm. In addition, under this attack, all sublinear-
regret bandit algorithms will pull the target arm O(T ) times.
However, the oracle attack is not practical. The goal of
our work is to develop an attack strategy that has similar
performance of the oracle attack strategy without requiring the
knowledge of the true mean rewards. When the user pulls a
non-target arm, the attacker could decide to attack by changing
the action to the possible worst arm. As the attacker does not
know the true value of arms, our attack scheme relies on lower
confidence bounds (LCB) of the value of each arm in making
attack decision. Correspondingly, we name our attack scheme
as LCB attack strategy. Our analysis shows that, if the target
arm selected by the attacker is not the worst arm, the LCB
attack strategy can successfully manipulate the user to select
the target arm almost all the time with an only logarithmic
cost. In particular, LCB attack strategy can force the user to
pull the target arm T −O(log(T )) times over T rounds, with
total attack cost being only O(log(T )). On the other hand,
we also show that, if the target arm is the worst arm and the
attacker can only incur logarithmic costs, no attack algorithm
can force the user to pull the worst arm more than T −O(Tα)
times.
Motivated by the analysis of the action-manipulation attacks
and the significant security threat to MABs, we then design
a bandit algorithm which can defend against the action-
manipulation attacks and still is able to achieve a small regret.
The main idea of the proposed algorithm is to bound the
maximum amount of offset, in terms of user’s estimate of
the mean rewards, that can be introduced by the action-
manipulation attacks. We then use this estimate of maximum
offset to properly modify the UCB algorithm and build spe-
cially designed high-probability upper bounds of the mean
rewards so as to decide which arm to pull. We name our
bandit algorithm as maximum offset upper confidence bound
(MOUCB). In particular, our algorithm firstly pulls every arm
a certain of times and then pulls the arm whose modified
upper confidence bound is largest. Furthermore, we prove that
MOUCB bandit algorithm has a pseudo-regret upper bounded
by O(max{log T,A}), where T is the total number of rounds
and A is an upper bound for the total attack cost. In particular,
if A scales as log(T ), MOUCB archives a logarithm pseudo-
regret which is same as the regret of UCB algorithm.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we describe the model. In Section III, we describe the
LCB attack strategy and analyze its accumulative attack cost.
In Section IV, we propose MOUCB and analyze its regret.
In Section V, we provide numerical examples to validate the
theoretic analysis. Finally, we offer several concluding remarks
in Section VI. The proofs are collected in Appendix.
II. MODEL
In this section, we introduce our model. We consider the
standard multi-armed stochastic bandit problems setting. The
environment consists of K arms, with each arm corresponds to
a fixed but unknown reward distribution. The bandit algorithm,
which is also called “user” in this paper, proceeds in discrete
time t = 1, 2, . . . , T , in which T is the total number of
rounds. At each round t, the user pulls an arm (or action)
It ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and receives a random reward rt drawn from
the reward distribution of arm It. Denote τi(t) := {s : s ≤
t, Is = i} as the set of rounds up to t where the user chooses
arm i, Ni(t) := |τi(t)| as the number of rounds that arm i
was pulled by the user up to time t and
µˆi(t) := Ni(t)
−1 ∑
s∈τi(t)
rs (1)
as the empirical mean reward of arm i. The pseudo-regret
R¯(T ) is defined as
R¯(T ) = T max
maxi∈[K]
µi − E
[
T∑
t=1
rt
]
. (2)
The goal of the user to minimize R¯(T ).
In this paper, we introduce a novel adversary setting, in
which the attacker sits between the user and the environment.
The attacker can monitor the actions of the user and the reward
signals from the environment. Furthermore, the attacker can
introduce action-manipulation attacks on stochastic bandits. In
particular, at each round t, after the user chooses an arm It,
the attacker can manipulate the user’s action by changing It to
another I0t ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. If the attacker decides not to attack,
I0t = It. The environment generates a random reward rt from
the reward distribution of post-attack arm I0t . Then the user
and the attacker receive reward rt from the environment.
Fig. 1. Action-manipulation attack model
Without loss of generality and for notation convenience,
we assume arm K is the “attack target” arm or target arm.
The attacker’s goal is to manipulate the user into pulling the
target arm very frequently but by making attacks as rarely as
possible. Define the set of rounds when the attacker decides
to attack as C := {t : t ≤ T, I0t 6= It}. The cumulative attack
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cost is the total number of rounds where the attacker decides
to attack, i.e., |C|.
In this paper, we assume that the reward distribution of arm
i follows σ2-sub-Gaussian distributions with mean µi. Denote
the true reward vector as µ = [µ1, · · · , µK ]. Neither the user
nor the attacker knows µ, but σ2 is known to both the user
and the attacker. Define the difference of mean value of arm i
and j as ∆i,j = µi−µj . Furthermore, we refer to the best arm
as iO = arg maxi µi and the worst arm as iW = arg mini µi.
Note that the assumption that the attacker does not know µ
is important. If the attacker knows these values, the attacker
can adopt a trivial oracle attack scheme: whenever the user
pulls a non-target arm It, the attacker changes It to the worst
arm iW . It is easy to show that, if the user uses a bandit
algorithm that has a regret upper bounded of O(log(T )) when
there is no attack, the oracle attack scheme can force the user
to pull the target arm T−O(log(T )) times, using a cumulative
cost |C| = O(log(T )). However, the oracle attack scheme is
not practical when the true reward vector is unknown. In this
paper, we will first design an effective attack scheme, which
does not assume the knowledge of true reward vector and
nearly matches the performance of the oracle attack scheme,
to attack the UCB algorithm. We will then design a new bandit
algorithm that is robust against the action-manipulation attack.
The action-manipulation attack considered here is different
from reward-manipulation attacks introduced by interesting
recent work [22], [23], where the attacker can change the
reward signal from the environment. In the setting considered
in [22], [23], the attacker can change the reward signal rt from
the environment to an arbitrary value chosen by the attacker.
Correspondingly, the cumulative attack cost in [22], [23] is
defined to be the sum of the absolute value of the changes on
the reward. Compared with the reward-manipulation attacks
discussed above, the action-manipulation attack is more dif-
ficult to carry out. In particular, as the action-manipulation
attack only changes the action, it can impact but does not
have direct control of the reward signal, which will be a
random variable drawn from a distribution depending on the
action chosen by the attacker. This is in contrast to reward-
manipulation attacks where an attacker can change the rewards
to any value.
III. ATTACK ON UCB AND COST ANALYSIS
In this section, we use UCB algorithm as an example to
illustrate the effects of action-manipulation attack. We will
introduce LCB attack strategy on the UCB bandit algorithm
and analyze the cost.
A. Attack strategy
UCB algorithm [28] is one of the most popular bandit
algorithm. In the UCB algorithm, the user initially pulls each
of the K arms once in the first K rounds. After that, the user
chooses arms according to
It = arg max
i
{
µˆi(t− 1) + 3σ
√
log t
Ni(t− 1)
}
. (3)
Under the action-manipulation attack, as the user does not
know that rt is generated from arm I0t instead of It, the
empirical mean µˆi(t) computed using (1) is not a proper
estimate of the true mean reward of arm i anymore. On the
other hand, the attack is able to obtain a good estimate of µi
by
µˆ0i (t) := N
0
i (t)
−1 ∑
s∈τ0i (t)
rs, (4)
where τ0i (t) := {s : s ≤ t, I0s = i} is the set of rounds up to
t when the attacker changes an arm to arm i, and N0i (t) =
|τ0i (t)| is the number of pulls of post-attack arm i up to round
t. This information gap provides a chance for attack. In this
section, we assume that the target arm is not the worst arm,
i.e., µK > µiW . We will discuss the case where the target arm
is the worst arm in Section III-C.
The proposed attack strategy works as follows. In the first
K rounds, the attacker does not attack. After that, at round t,
if the user chooses a non-target arm It, the attacker changes it
to arm I0t that has the smallest lower confidence bound (LCB):
I0t = arg min
i
{
µˆ0i (t− 1)− CB
(
N0i (t− 1)
)}
, (5)
where
CB(N) =
√
2σ2
N
log
pi2KN2
3δ
. (6)
Here δ is a parameter that is related to the probability
statements in the analytical results presented in Section III-B.
We call our scheme as LCB attack strategy. If at round t the
user chooses the target arm, the attacker does not attack. Thus
the cumulative attack cost of our LCB attack scheme is equal
to the total of times when the non-target arms are selected by
the user. The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: LCB attack strategy on UCB algorithm
Input:
The user’s bandit algorithm, target arm K
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
2: The user chooses arm It to pull according to UCB
algorithm (3).
3: if It = K then
4: The attacker does not attack, and I0t = It.
5: else
6: The attacker attacks and changes arm It to I0t
chosen according to (5).
7: end if
8: The environment generates reward rt from arm I0t .
9: The attacker and the user receive rt.
10: end for
Here, we highlight the main idea why LCB attack strategy
works. As discussed in Section II, if the attacker knows which
arm is the worst, the attacker can simply change the action
to the worst arm when the user pulls the non-target arm. The
main idea of the attack scheme is to estimate the mean of each
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arm, and change the non-target arm to the arm whose lower
confidence bound is the smallest. Effectively, this will almost
always change the non-target arm to the worst arm. More
formally, for i 6= K, we will show that this attack strategy
will ensure that µˆi computed using (1) by the user converges
to µiW . On the other hand, as the attacker does not attack
when the user selects K, µˆK computed by the user will still
converge to the true mean µK with NK increasing. Because
the assumption that the target arm is not the worst, which
implies that µK > µiW , µˆi could be smaller than µˆK . Then
the user will rarely pull the non-target arms as µˆi is smaller
than µˆK . Hence, the attack cost would also be small. The
rigorous analysis of the cost will be provided in Section III-B.
B. Cost analysis
To analyze the cost of the proposed scheme, we need to
track µˆ0i (t), the estimate obtained by the attacker using (4),
and µˆi(t), the estimate obtained by the user using (1).
The analysis of µˆ0i (t) is relatively simple, as the attacker
knows which arm is truly pulled and hence µˆ0i (t) is the true
estimate of the mean of arm i. Define event
E1 := {∀i,∀t > K : |µˆ0i (t)− µi| < CB(N0i (t))}. (7)
Roughly speaking, event E1 is the event that the empirical
mean computed by the attacker using (4) is close to the true
mean. The following lemma, proved in [22], shows that the
attacker can accurately estimate the average reward to each
arm.
Lemma 1. (Lemma 1 in [22]) For δ ∈ (0, 1), P(E1) > 1− δ.
The analysis of µˆi(t) computed by the user is more com-
plicated. When the user pulls arm i, because of the action-
manipulation attacks, the random rewards may be drawn
from different reward distributions. Define τi,j(t) := {s :
s ≤ t, Is = i and I0s = j} as the set of rounds up to
t when the user chooses arm i and the attacker changes
it to arm j. Lemma 2 shows a high-probability confidence
bounds of µˆi,j(t) := Ni,j(t)−1
∑
s∈τi,j(t) rs, the empirical
mean rewards of a part of arm i whose post-attack arm is
j, where Ni,j(t) := |τi,j(t)|. Define event
E2 := {∀i,∀j,∀t > K : |µˆi,j(t)− µj | <√
2σ2
Ni,j(t)
log
pi2K2(Ni,j(t))2
3δ
}
.
(8)
Lemma 2. For δ ∈ (0, 1), P(E2) > 1− δ.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix A.
Although rs in (1), used to calculate µˆi(t), may be drawn
from different reward distributions, we can build a high-
probability bound of µˆi(t) with the help of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. Under event E2, for all arm i and all t > K, we
have ∣∣∣∣∣∣µˆi(t)− 1Ni(t)
∑
s∈τi(t)
µI0s
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < β(Ni(t)), (9)
where
β(Ni(t)) =
√
2σ2K
Ni(t)
log
pi2(Ni(t))2
3δ
. (10)
Proof. Please refer to Appendix B.
Under events E1 and E2, we can build a connection between
uˆi(t) and µiW . In the proposed LCB attack strategy, the
attacker explores and exploits the worst arm by a lower
confidence bound method. Thus, when the user pulls a non-
target arm, the attacker changes it to the worst arm at most of
rounds, which means that for all i 6= K, uˆi(t) will converge
to µiW as Ni(t) increases. Lemma 4 shows the relationship
between uˆi(t) and µiW .
Lemma 4. Under events E1 and E2, using LCB attack strat-
egy 1, we have
µˆi(t) ≤ uiW +
1
Ni(t)
∑
j 6=iW
8σ2
∆j,iW
log
pi2Kt2
3δ
(11)
+
√
2σ2K
Ni(t)
log
pi2(Ni(t))2
3δ
,∀i, t. (12)
Proof. Please refer to Appendix C.
Lemma 4 shows an upper bound of the empirical mean
reward of pre-attack arm i, for all arm i 6= K. Our main
results is the following upper bound on the attack cost |C|.
Theorem 1. With probability at least 1 − 2δ, when T ≥(
pi2K
3δ
) 2
5
, using LCB attack strategy specified in Algorithm 1,
the attacker can manipulate the user into pulling the target
arm in at least T − |C| rounds, with an attack cost
|C| ≤ K − 1
4∆2K,iW
(
3σ
√
log T +
√
2σ2K log
pi2T 2
3δ
+
(3σ√log T +√2σ2K log pi2T 2
3δ
)2
+4∆K,iW
∑
j 6=iW
8σ2
∆j,iW
log
pi2KT 2
3δ
 12

2
.
(13)
Proof. Please refer to Appendix D.
The expression of the cost bound in Theorem 1 is compli-
cated. The following corollary provides a simpler bound that
is more explicit and interpretable.
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Corollary 1. Under the same assumptions in Theorem 1, the
total attack cost |C| of Algorithm 1 is upper bounded by
O
Kσ2 log T
∆2K,iW
K + ∑
j 6=iW
∆K,iW
∆j,iW
+
√
K
∑
j 6=iW
∆K,iW
∆j,iW
 ,
(14)
and the total number of target arm pulls is T − |C|.
From Corollary 1, we can see that the attack cost scales
as log T . Two important constants σ∆K,iW
and
∑
j 6=iW
∆K,iW
∆j,iW
have impact on the prelog factor. In Section V, we provide
some numerical examples to illustrate the effects of these two
constants on the attack cost.
C. Attacks fail when the target arm is the worst arm
One weakness of our LCB attack strategy is that the attack
target arm is necessarily a non-worst arm. In the LCB attack
strategy, the attacker can not force the user to pull the worst
arm very frequently by spending only logarithmic cost. The
main reason is that, when the target arm is the worst, the
average reward of each arm is larger or equal to that of the
target arm. As the result, our attack scheme is not able to
ensure that the target arm has a higher expected reward than
the user’s estimate of the rewards of other arms. In fact, the
following theorem shows that all action-manipulation attack
can not manipulate the UCB algorithm into pulling the worst
arm more than T −O(log(T )) by spending only logarithmic
cost.
Theorem 2. Let δ < 12 . Suppose the attack cost is limited
by O(log(T )), there is no attack that can force the UCB
algorithm to pick the worst arm more than T −O(Tα) times
with probability at least 1− δ, in which α < 964K .
Proof. Please refer to Appendix E.
This theorem shows a contrast between the case where the
target arm is not the worst arm and the case where the target
arm is the worst arm. If the target arm is not the worst arm,
our scheme is able to force the user to pick the target arm
T −O(log(T )) times with only logarithmic cost. On the other
hand, if the target arm is the worst, Theorem 2 shows that
there is no attack strategy that can force the user to pick the
worst arm more than T −O(Tα) times while incurring only
logarithmic cost.
IV. ROBUST ALGORITHM AND REGRET ANALYSIS
The results in Section III exposes a significant security
threat of the action-manipulation attacks on MABs. Under only
O(log(T )) times of attacks carried out using the proposed
LCB strategy, the UCB algorithm will almost always pull the
target arm selected by the attacker. Although there are some
defense algorithms [24] and universal best arm identification
schemes [29] for stochastic or adversarial bandit, they do not
apply to action-manipulation attack setting. This motivates us
to design a new bandit algorithm that is robust against action-
manipulation attacks. In this section, we propose such a robust
bandit algorithm and analyze its regret.
A. Robust Bandit algorithm
In this section, we assume that a valid upper bound A for
the cumulative attack cost |C| is known for the user, although
the user do not have to know the exact cumulative attack cost
|C|. A does not need to be constant, it can scale with T . In
other words, for a given A, our proposed algorithm is robust
to all action-manipulation attacks with a cumulative attack
cost |C| < A. This assumption is reasonable, as if the cost is
unbounded, it will not be possible to design a robust scheme.
We first introduce some notation. Denote N(t − 1) :=
(N1(t − 1), . . . , NK(t − 1)) as the vector counting how
many times each action has been taken by the user, and
µˆ(t − 1) = (µˆ1(t − 1), . . . , µˆK(t − 1)) as the vector of the
sample means computed by the user. The proposed algorithm
is a modified UCB method by taking the maximum possible
mean estimate offset due to attack into consideration. We name
our scheme as maximum offset UCB (MOUCB).
The proposed MOUCB works as follows. In the first 2AK
rounds, MOUCB algorithm pulls each arm 2A times. After
that, at round t, the user chooses an arm It by a modified
UCB method:
It = arg max
a
{µˆa(t− 1) + β(Na(t− 1))
+γ(µˆ(t− 1),N(t− 1))} ,
(15)
where
γ(µˆ(t− 1),N(t− 1)) = 2A
Na(t− 1)
max
i,j
{µˆi(t− 1)− µˆj(t− 1) + β(Ni(t− 1)) + β(Nj(t− 1))} ,
and
β(N) =
√
2σ2K
N
log
pi2N2
3δ
. (16)
The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Compared with the original UCB algorithm in (3), the main
difference is the additional term γ(µˆ(t−1),N(t−1)) in (15).
We now highlight the main idea why our bandit algorithm
works and the role of this additional term. In particular, in
the standard multi-armed stochastic bandit problem, µˆi(t) is
a proper estimation of µi, the true mean reward of arm i.
However, under the action-manipulation attacks, as the user
does not know which arm is used to generate rt, µˆi(t) is not
a proper estimate of the true mean reward anymore. However,
we can try to find a good bound of the true mean reward. If
we know ∆iO,iW , the reward difference between the optimal
arm and the worst arm, we can describe the maximum offset
of the mean rewards caused by the attack. In particular, we
have
µi − A
Ni(t)
∆iO,iW ≤
1
Ni(t)
∑
s∈τi(t)
µI0s ≤ µi +
A
Ni(t)
∆iO,iW ,
(17)
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Algorithm 2: Proposed MOUCB bandit algorithm
Input:
A valid upper bound A for the cumulative attack cost.
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
2: if t ≤ 2AK then
3: The user pulls the arm whose pull count is the
smallest, i.e. It = arg miniNi(t− 1).
4: else
5: The user chooses arm It to pull according (15).
6: end if
7: if The attacker decides to attack then
8: The attacker attacks and changes It to I0t .
9: else
10: The attacker does not attack and I0t = It.
11: end if
12: The environment generates reward rt from arm I0t .
13: The attacker and the user receive rt.
14: end for
which implies
µi ≤ A
Ni(t)
∆iO,iW +
1
Ni(t)
∑
s∈τi(t)
µI0s . (18)
In (18), the first term in the right hand side is the maximum
offset that an attacker can introduce regardless of the attack
strategy. The second term in the right hand side is related to
the mean estimated by the user. In particular, under event E2,
as shown in Lemma 3, we have
1
Ni(t)
∑
s∈τi(t)
µI0s < µˆi(t) + β(Ni(t)). (19)
Hence, regardless the attack strategy, we have a upper
confidence bound on µi:
µi ≤ µˆi(t) + A
Ni(t)
∆iO,iW + β(Ni(t)). (20)
In our case, however, ∆iO,iW is also unknown. In our algo-
rithm, we obtain a high-probability bound on ∆iO,iW :
∆iO,iW ≤ 2 max
i,j
{µˆi − µˆj + β (Ni(t)) + β (Nj(t))} , (21)
which will proved in Lemma 5 below. Now, the second term
of (20) becomes γ(µˆ(t− 1),N(t− 1)) if we replace ∆iO,iW
with the bound (21), and we obtain our final algorithm.
B. Regret analysis
Lemma 5 shows a boundary of ∆iO,iW the maximum
reward difference between any two arms, under event E2.
Lemma 5. For δ ≤ 13 , t > 2AK and under event E2, MOUCB
algorithm have
∆iO,iW ≤ 2 max
i,j
{µˆi − µˆj + β (Ni(t)) + β (Nj(t))}
≤ 2∆iO,iW + 8
√
σ2K
A
log
4pi2A2
3δ
.
(22)
Proof. Please refer to Appendix F.
Using Lemma 5, we now bound the regret of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3. Let A be an upper bound on the total attack
cost |C|. For δ ≤ 13 and T ≥ 2AK, MOUCB algorithm has
pseudo-regret R¯(T )
R¯(T ) ≤
∑
a6=iO
max
{
8σ2K
∆iO,a
log
pi2T 2
3δ
, A (∆iO,a
+2∆iO,iW + 8
√
σ2K
A
log
4pi2A2
3δ
)}
,
(23)
with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. Please refer to Appendix G.
Theorem 3 reveals that our bandit algorithm is robust to the
action-manipulation attacks. If the total attack cost is bounded
by O(log T ), the pseudo-regret of MOUCB bandit algorithm
is still bounded by O(log T ). This is in contrast with UCB,
for which we have shown that the pseudo-regret is O(T ) with
attack cost O(log T ) in Section III. If the total attack cost is up
to Ω(log T ), the pseudo-regret of MOUCB bandit algorithm
is bounded by O(A), which is linear in A.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical examples to illustrate
the analytical results obtained. In our simulation, the bandit
has 10 arms. The rewards distribution of arm i is N (µi, σ).
The attacker’s target arm is K. We let δ = 0.05. We then
run the experiment for multiple trials and in each trial we run
T = 107 rounds.
A. LCB attack strategy
We first illustrate the impact of the proposed LCB attack
strategy on UCB algorithm.
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Fig. 2. Number of rounds the target arm was pulled
In Figure 2, we fix σ = 0.1 and ∆K,iW = 0.1 and compare
the number of rounds at which the target arm is pulled with
and without attack. In this experiment, the mean rewards of
all arms are 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.1, and 0.2
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respectively. Arm K is not the worst arm, but its average
reward is lower than most arms. The results are averaged over
20 trials. The attacker successfully manipulates the user into
pulling the target arm very frequently.
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Fig. 3. Attack cost vs σ
∆K,iW
In Figure 3, in order to study how σ∆K,iW
affects the attack
cost, we fix ∆K,iW = 0.1 and set σ as 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5
respectively. The mean rewards of all arms are same as above.
From the figure, we can see that as σ∆K,iW
increases, the attack
cost increases. In addition, as predicted in our analysis, the
attack cost increases with T , the total number of rounds, in a
logarithmic order.
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Fig. 4. Attack cost vs
∑
j 6=iW
∆K,iW
∆j,iW
Figure 4 illustrates how
∑
j 6=iW
∆K,iW
∆j,iW
affects the attack
cost. In this experiment, we fix σ∆K,iW
= 1 and set ∆K,iW
as 0.2, 0.6 and 0.9 respectively. The mean rewards of all
arms are the same as above. The figure illustrates that, as∑
j 6=iW
∆K,iW
∆j,iW
increases, the attack cost also increases. This
is consistent with our analysis in Corollary 1.
B. MOUCB bandit algorithm
We now illustrate the effectiveness of MOUCB bandit
algorithm.
In this experiment, we use the similar setting as in the
simulation of the LCB attack scheme. The mean rewards of all
arms are set to be 1.0, 0.8, 0.9, 0.5, 0.2, 0.3, 0.1, 0.4, 0.7, and
0.6 respectively. The total attack cost |C| is limited by 2000.
A given valid upper bound for total attack cost is A = 3000.
The results are averaged over 20 trials.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of number of rounds the optimal arm was pulled
In Figure 5, we simulate MOUCB algorithm with two
different attacks, and compare the numbers of rounds when
the optimal arm is pulled under these attacks. The first attack
is the LCB attack discussed in Section III. The second attack
is the oracle attack, in which the attacker knows the true
mean reward of arms and implements the oracle attacks that
change any non-target arm to a worst arm (see the discussion
in Section II). For comparison purposes, we also add the curve
for MOUCB under no attack, and the curve for UCB under
no attack. The results show that, even under the oracle attack,
the proposed MOUCB bandit algorithm achieves almost the
same performance as the UCB without attack.
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Fig. 6. Number of rounds the optimal arm was pulled using UCB algorithm
To further compare the performance of UCB and MOUCB,
in Figure 6, we illustrate the performance of UCB algorithm
for the three scenarios discussed above: under LCB attack,
under oracle attack and under no attack. The results show that
both LCB and oracle attacks can successfully manipulates the
UCB algorithm into pulling a non-optimal arm very frequently,
as the curves for the LCB attack and oracle attack are far away
from the curve for no attack. This is in sharp contrast with the
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situation for MOUCB algorithm shown in Figure 5, where the
all curves are almost identical.
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Fig. 7. Pseudo-regret of MOUCB algorithm
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Fig. 8. Pseudo-regret of UCB algorithm
Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate the pseudo-regret of
MOUCB bandit algorithm and UCB bandit algorithm respec-
tively. In Figure 7, as predicted in our analysis, MOUCB
algorithm archives logarithmic pseudo-regrets under both LCB
attacks and the oracle attacks. Furthermore, the curves under
both attacks are very close to that of the case without attacks.
However, as shown in Figure 8, the pseudo-regret of UCB
grows linearly under both attacks, while grows logarithmically
under no attack. The figures again show that UCB is vulnerable
to action-manipulation attacks while the proposed MOUCB is
robust to the attacks (even for oracle attacks).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a new class of attacks
on stochastic bandits: action-manipulation attacks. We have
analyzed the attack against on the UCB algorithm and proved
that the proposed LCB attack scheme can force the user
to almost always pull a non-worst arm with only logarithm
effort. To defend against this type of attacks, we have further
designed a new bandit algorithm MOUCB that is robust
to action-manipulation attacks. We have analyzed the regret
of MOUCB under any attack with bounded cost, and have
showed that the proposed algorithm is robust to the action-
manipulation attacks.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The proof is similar with the proof of Lemma 1 that was
proved in [22]. Let {Xj}∞j=1 be a sequence of i.i.d σ2-
sub-Gaussian random variables with mean µ. Let µˆ0(t) =
1
N(t)
∑N(t)
j=1 Xj . By Hoeffding’s inequality.
P(|µˆ0(t)− µ| ≥ η) ≤ 2 exp
(
−N(t)η
2
2σ2
)
. (24)
In order to ensure that E2 holds for all arm i, all arm j and all
pull counts N = Ni,j(t), we set δi,j,N := 6δpi2K2N2 . We have
P
(
∃i,∃j,∃N : |µˆi,j(t)− µj | ≥
√
2σ2
N
log
pi2K2N2
3δ
)
=
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
∞∑
N=1
δi,N = δ.
(25)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
According to event E2, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣µˆi(t)− 1Ni(t)
∑
s∈τi(t)
µI0s
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
j=1
Ni,j(t)
Ni(t)
(µˆi,j(t)− µj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
K∑
j=1
Ni,j(t)
Ni(t)
|µˆi,j(t)− µj |
<
1
Ni(t)
K∑
j=1
√
2σ2Ni,j(t) log
pi2K2(Ni,j(t))2
3δ
.
(26)
Define a function f(N) =
√
2σ2N log
pi2K2N2
3δ
: R→ R,
and we have
f ′′(N) =
∂2
∂N2
√
2σ2N log
pi2K2N2
3δ
=−
(
2σ2 log pi
2K2N2
3δ
)2
+ 16σ4
4
(
2σ2N log pi
2K2N2
3δ
) 3
2
<0,
(27)
when N ≥ 1.
Hence f is strictly concave when N ≥ 1, and we have
K∑
j=1
f(Ni,j(t)) < Kf
 1
K
K∑
j=1
Ni,j(t)
 = Kf (Ni(t)
K
)
.
(28)
8
Thus, ∣∣∣∣∣∣µˆi(t)− 1Ni(t)
∑
s∈τi(t)
µI0s
∣∣∣∣∣∣
<
1
Ni(t)
K
√√√√
2σ2
Ni(t)
K
log
pi2K2
(
Ni(t)
K
)2
3δ
=
√
2σ2K
Ni(t)
log
pi2(Ni(t))2
3δ
.
(29)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
The LCB attack scheme uses lower confidence bound to
exploit the worst arm, so we need to prove that the attacker’s
pull counts of all non-worst arms should be limited at round
t.
Consider the case that in round t + 1, the user chooses a
non-target arm It+1 = i 6= K and the attacker changes it to a
non-worst arm I0t+1 = j 6= iW . On one hand, under event E1,
we have
µˆ0iW (t)− µiW < CB(N0iW (t)),
and µˆ0j (t)− µj > −CB(N0j (t)).
(30)
On the other hand, according to the attack scheme, it must
be the case that
µˆ0iW (t)− CB(N0iW (t)) > µˆ0j (t)− CB(N0j (t)), (31)
which is equivalent to
CB(N0j (t)) > µˆ
0
j (t)− (µˆ0iW (t)− CB(N0iW (t))). (32)
Combining (32) with (30), we have
CB(N0j (t)) > µj − CB(N0j (t))− µiW
and CB(N0j (t)) >
∆j,iW
2
.
(33)
Using on the fact that N0j (t) ≤ t and Ni,j(t) ≤ N0j (t), we
have
∆j,iW
2
<CB(N0j (t))
=
√
2σ2
N0j (t)
log
pi2K(N0j (t))
2
3δ
≤
√
2σ2
N0j (t)
log
pi2Kt2
3δ
≤
√
2σ2
Ni,j(t)
log
pi2Kt2
3δ
,
(34)
which is equivalent to
Ni,j(t) <
8σ2
∆2j,iW
log
pi2Kt2
3δ
. (35)
Hence, under event E2, we have
µˆi(t) <
1
Ni(t)
∑
s∈τi(t)
µI0s +
√
2σ2K
Ni(t)
log
pi2(Ni(t))2
3δ
=
1
Ni(t)
∑
j
∑
s∈τi,j(t)
µI0s +
√
2σ2K
Ni(t)
log
pi2(Ni(t))2
3δ
=
1
Ni(t)
∑
j
Ni,j(t)µj +
√
2σ2K
Ni(t)
log
pi2(Ni(t))2
3δ
=
∑
j
Ni,j(t)
Ni(t)
(∆j,iW + µiW ) +
√
2σ2K
Ni(t)
log
pi2(Ni(t))2
3δ
<µiW +
√
2σ2K
Ni(t)
log
pi2(Ni(t))2
3δ
+
1
Ni(t)
∑
j 6=iW
8σ2
∆j,iW
log
pi2Kt2
3δ
.
(36)
The lemma is proved.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
By inferring from Lemma 1, we have that with probability
1− δK , ∀t > K : |µˆ0K(t)− µK | < CB(N0K(t)).
Because the LCB attack scheme does not attack the target
arm, we can also conclude that with probability 1− δK , ∀t >
K : |µˆK(t)− µK | < CB(NK(t)).
The user relies on the UCB algorithm to choose arms. If at
round t, the user chooses an arm It = i 6= K, which is not
the target arm, we have
µˆi(t− 1) + 3σ
√
log t
Ni(t− 1) > µˆK(t− 1) + 3σ
√
log t
NK(t− 1) ,
(37)
which is equivalent to
3σ
√
log t
Ni(t− 1) > −µˆi(t− 1) + µˆK(t− 1) + 3σ
√
log t
NK(t− 1) .
(38)
Under event E1, we have
µˆK(t) > µK − CB(NK(t)). (39)
Under event E1 ∩ E2, according to Lemma 4, we have
µˆi(t) ≤ µiW +
√
2σ2K
Ni(t)
log
pi2(Ni(t))2
3δ
+
1
Ni(t)
∑
j 6=iW
8σ2
∆j,iW
log
pi2Kt2
3δ
.
(40)
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Combing the inequalities above,
3σ
√
log t
Ni(t− 1) > −µiW −
√
2σ2K
Ni(t− 1) log
pi2(Ni(t− 1))2
3δ
− 1
Ni(t− 1)
∑
j 6=iW
8σ2
∆j,iW
log
pi2K(t− 1)2
3δ
+ µK − CB(NK(t− 1)) + 3σ
√
log t
NK(t− 1) .
(41)
When t ≥ (pi2K3δ )
2
5 ,
3σ
√
log t
NK(t− 1) ≥
√
4σ2
log t
NK(t− 1) + 5σ
2
log(pi
2K
3δ )
2
5
NK(t− 1)
≥
√
2σ2
log pi
2Kt2
3δ
NK(t− 1)
≥
√
2σ2
log pi
2K(NK(t−1))2
3δ
NK(t− 1)
= CB(NK(t− 1)).
(42)
Now the inequality only depends on Ni(t − 1) and some
constants:
3σ
√
log t
Ni(t− 1) >∆K,iW −
√
2σ2K
Ni(t− 1) log
pi2(Ni(t− 1))2
3δ
− 1
Ni(t− 1)
∑
j 6=iW
8σ2
∆j,iW
log
pi2K(t− 1)2
3δ
>∆K,iW −
√
2σ2K
Ni(t− 1) log
pi2t2
3δ
− 1
Ni(t− 1)
∑
j 6=iW
8σ2
∆j,iW
log
pi2Kt2
3δ
.
(43)
By solving the inequality above, we have:
Ni(t− 1) < 1
4∆2K,iW
(
3σ
√
log t+
√
2σ2K log
pi2t2
3δ
+
(3σ√log t+√2σ2K log pi2t2
3δ
)2
+4∆K,iW
∑
j 6=iW
8σ2
∆j,iW
log
pi2Kt2
3δ
 12

2
.
(44)
Since event E1∩E2 occurs with probability at least 1−2δ, we
have that (44) holds with probability at least 1−2δ. Theorem 1
follows immediately from the definition of the attack cost and
(44).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Because the target arm is the worst arm, the mean rewards
of all arms are larger than or equal to that of the target arm.
Thus, for any attack scheme, we have
1
Ni(t)
∑
s∈τi(t)
µI0s ≥ µK . (45)
If the user pulls arm K at round t, according to UCB
algorithm, we have for any arm i 6= K,
µˆi(t− 1) + 3σ
√
log t
Ni(t− 1) < µˆK(t− 1) + 3σ
√
log t
NK(t− 1) .
(46)
Under event E2, we have Lemma 3 and (29) holds for all
arm i, which implies
µˆi(t− 1) > 1
Ni(t− 1)
∑
s∈τi(t−1)
µI0s−√
2σ2K
Ni(t− 1) log
pi2(Ni(t− 1))2
3δ
,
(47)
and
µˆK(t− 1) < 1
NK(t− 1)
∑
s∈τK(t−1)
µI0s+√
2σ2K
NK(t− 1) log
pi2(NK(t− 1))2
3δ
.
(48)
Noted that for δ > 12 , h(N) = 2σ
2N
K
log
pi2N2
3δ
: R → R
is monotonically decreasing in N ≥ 1.
If Ni(t−1) < 116NK(t−1) and Ni(t−1) <
√
3δ
pi t
9
64K hold
for any arm i, we have
3σ
√
log t
NK(t− 1) <
3
4
σ
√
log t
Ni(t− 1) ,
(49)
and √
2σ2K
NK(t− 1) log
pi2(NK(t− 1))2
3δ
<
√
2σ2K
Ni(t− 1) log
pi2(Ni(t− 1))2
3δ
<
3
4
σ
√
log t
Ni(t− 1) .
(50)
Combining the inequalities above, we find
3
4
σ
√
log t
Ni(t− 1) <
1
NK(t− 1)
∑
s∈τK(t−1)
µI0s − µK . (51)
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Since the attack cost is limited in O(log t),
1
NK(t− 1)
∑
s∈τK(t−1)
µI0s − µK =
O(log t)
NK(t− 1) , (52)
so
Ni(t− 1) = Ω(σ(NK(t− 1))2). (53)
In summary, as long as the event E2 holds, at least one of
the three following equations must be true:
Ni(t− 1) = Ω(σ(NK(t− 1))2),
Ni(t− 1) ≥ 1
16
NK(t− 1),
Ni(t− 1) ≥
√
3δ
pi
t
9
64K .
(54)
In addition, any one of the three equations shows that the
user pulls the non-target arm more than O(tα) times, in which
α < 964K . Since event E2 holds with probability at least 1− δ,
the conclusion in the Theorem holds with probability at least
1− δ.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Note that for δ ≤ 13 , β(N) =
√
2σ2K
N log
pi2N2
3δ is mono-
tonically decreasing in N , as
∂
∂N
β2(N) =
2σ2K
N2
(
2− log pi
2N2
3δ
)
≤2σ
2K
N2
(
2− log pi
2
3δ
)
< 0.
(55)
We first prove the first inequality in Lemma 5. Consider the
optimal arm iO and the worst arm iW . Define Ci := |{t : t ≤
T, I0t 6= It = i}|. In the action-manipulation setting, when
t > 2AK, MOUCB algorithm has
1
NiO (t)
∑
s∈τiO (t)
µI0s ≥
NiO (t)− CiO
NiO (t)
µiO +
CiO
NiO (t)
µiW
= µiO −∆iO,iW
CiO
NiO (t)
≥ µiO −∆iO,iW
CiO
2A
,
(56)
and
1
NiW (t)
∑
s∈τiW (t)
µI0s ≤
NiW (t)− CiW
NiW (t)
µiW +
CiW
NiW (t)
µiO
= µiW + ∆iO,iW
CiW
NiW (t)
≤ µiW + ∆iO,iW
CiW
2A
.
(57)
Combining (56) and (57), we have
1
NiO (t)
∑
s∈τiO (t)
µI0s −
1
NiW (t)
∑
s∈τiW (t)
µI0s
≥µiO − µiW −∆iO,iW
CiW
2A
−∆iO,iW
CiO
2A
≥µiO − µiW −∆iO,iW
A
2A
=
∆iO,iW
2
.
(58)
From (29), we could find
1
NiO (t)
∑
s∈τiO (t)
µI0s −
1
NiW (t)
∑
s∈τiW (t)
µI0s
≤µˆiO (t) + β(NiO (t))− (µˆiW (t)− β(NiW (t)))
≤max
i,j
{µˆi(t) + β(Ni(t))− (µˆj(t)− β (Nj(t)))} .
(59)
We now prove the second inequality in Lemma 5:
max
i,j
{µˆi(t) + β(Ni(t))− (µˆj(t)− β(Nj(t)))}
≤max
i,j
 1Ni(t) ∑
s∈τi(t)
µI0s + 2β(Ni(t))
−
 1
Ni(t)
∑
s∈τi(t)
µI0s − 2β(Nj(t))

≤∆iO,iW + max
i,j
{2β(Ni(t)) + 2β(Nj(t))} .
(60)
Recall that for δ ≤ 13 , β(N) =
√
2σ2K
N log
pi2N2
3δ is
monotonically decreasing in N . Therefore,
max
i,j
{2β(Ni(t)) + 2β(Nj(t))} ≤ 4β(2A). (61)
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
MOUCB algorithm firstly pulls each arm 2A times. Then
for t > 2AK and under event E2, if at round t+ 1, MOUCB
algorithm choose a non-optimal arm It+1 = a 6= iO, we have
µˆa + β(Na(t))+
2A
Na(t)
max
i,j
{µˆi − µˆj + β(Ni(t)) + β(Nj(t))}
≥µˆiO + β(NiO (t))+
2A
NiO (t)
max
i,j
{µˆi − µˆj + β(Ni(t)) + β(Nj(t))} ,
which implies to
µˆa +
A
Na(t)
(
2∆iO,iW + 8
√
σ2K
A
log
4pi2A2
3δ
)
+ β(Na(t))
≥µˆiO +
A
NiO (t)
∆iO,iW + β(NiO (t)),
according to Lemma 5.
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From equation (29), we could find
µˆa ≤ 1
Na(t)
∑
s∈τa(t)
µI0s + β(Na(t))
≤ µa + ∆iO,a
Ca
Na(t)
+ β(Na(t))
≤ µa + ∆iO,a
A
Na(t)
+ β(Na(t)),
and
µˆiO ≥
1
NiO (t)
∑
s∈τiO (t)
µI0s − β(NiO (t))
≥ µiO −∆iO,iW
CiO
NiO (t)
− β(NiO (t))
≥ µiO −∆iO,iW
A
NiO (t)
− β(NiO (t)).
By combining the inequalities above, we have
µiO ≤µa + ∆iO,a
A
Na(t)
+ 2β(Na(t))+
A
Na(t)
(
2∆iO,iW + 8
√
σ2K
A
log
4pi2A2
3δ
)
,
which is equivalent to
∆io,a ≤∆iO,a
A
Na(t)
+ 2
√
2σ2K
Na(t)
log
pi2(Na(t))2
3δ
+
A
Na(t)
(
2∆iO,iW + 8
√
σ2K
A
log
4pi2A2
3δ
)
≤2
√
2σ2K
Na(t)
log
pi2t2
3δ
+
A
Na(t)
(∆iO,a+
2∆iO,iW + 8
√
σ2K
A
log
4pi2A2
3δ
)
.
Therefore,
Na(t) ≤ max
{
8σ2K
∆2iO,a
log
pi2t2
3δ
,
A
∆io,a
(∆iO,a
+2∆iO,iW + 8
√
σ2K
A
log
4pi2A2
3δ
)}
.
(62)
As event E2 holds with probability at least 1 − δ, (44) holds
with probability at least 1 − δ. Then Theorem 3 follows
immediately from the definition of the pseudo-regret in (2)
and equation (62).
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